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Abstract
Since its inception, Stakeholder Theory has served as an important corporate governance theory,
providing an holistic framework for situation analyses and strategic decision-making. Since its
conceptualisation, there has been a call to go beyond normative models of stakeholder management to
explore the implications of 'stakeholder conflict management' and the development of 'stakeholder
management capabilities'. This paper undertakes an analysis of the regional Tasmanian state
government's approach to the management of dissenting stakeholder groups towards a controversial
retail development. The paper provides a discussion of the manner in which their governance structure
included the use of delay tactics, the abdication of responsibility, and the building of bureaucratic
layers that effectively diluted the will of stakeholder groups to continue their dissenting activities.
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1. Introduction
Since its inception some 25 years ago, Stakeholder
Theory has served as an important theory of the finn,
providingan holistic framework for situationanalyses
and strategic decision-making (Freeman, 1984;
Froornan, 1999; Hendry, 2001; Nwanji and Fu, 2007;
Preble, 2005; Sternberg, 1997). StakeholderTheory's
intuitive appeal, and relative simplicity of
operationalisation, has contributed to its widespread
acceptance by both academics and practitioners alike
as an important corporate governance tool (Fassin,
2008; Friedman and Miles, 2006; Tomasic and Fu,
2006). Since its original conceptualisation,
substantial research effort has been undertaken to
solidify its tenets (see for example Donaldson and
Preston. 1995;Gibson, 2000; Wolfe and Putler, 2(02)
and to prescribe a means for the effective
management of stakeholders (see Greenwood, 2007;
Roloff, 2008; Schaefer, 2007; Szwajkowski, 2000;
Zakhem, 2(08). The almost singular focus on the
practical implementation of Stakeholder Theory has
increased in recent years (see Bourne. 2008; Frynas,
2008; Johansson, 2008; Vilanova, 2(07), and there
has been a call to go beyond nonnative models of
stakeholder management to explore the strategic
implications of 'stakeholder conflict management'
and the development of 'stakeholder management
capabilities' (Letza, Sun and Kirkbride, 2004;
Zakhern,2(08).
2. 'Stakeholder Management' Versus
'Stakeholder Management Capability'
'Stakeholder management' is the term given to the
system by which organisationspursue their objectives
whilst considering the interests of its stakeholders
(Freeman,2004; Jackson, 2(05). To develop specific
strategies to manage its stakeholder relationships,
organisations first need to determine "who is a
stakeholder?" and "what is the nature of the
relationship between the organisation and the
stakeholder?" (Frooman, 1999; Greenwood, 2(01).
Within the realm of Stakeholder Theory there is a
divergence between the nonnative and instrumental
doctrines. The nonnative theorists have attempted to
developa more comprehensive frameworkof strategic
management by broadening the definition of
stakeholders to include any group or individual who
affects or is in any way affected by the organisation.
One problem for the construction of effective
corporate governance regimes is that this virtually
includes 'everyone, everything and everywhere'
(Sternberg. 1997, 2000). Under this broad definition,
organisations may be faced with a bewilderingly
complex set of claims that cannot reasonably be
accommodated (Letza, Sun and Kirkbride, 2004;
Zakhem, 2(08). The instrumental theorists have
recognised this vaguely defined term of stakeholder
limits the usefulness and validity of the concept,
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therefore, they have put forward a more narrow view
which is based on the actual limits of the
organisation's resources, time, attention and patience
of managers for dealing with external constraints
(Letza, Sun and Kirkbride, 2004; Mitchell, Agle and
Wood, 1997). A typical instrumental process model
for the identification (and 'management') of an
organisation's stakeholder groups is represented in
Figure I.
Figure 1. An Instrumental Process Model for Stakeholder Management (Johansson, 2(08)
1. Identification of salient stakeholder groups, perspectives and agendas
Perceived legitimacy, influence, urgencyand coherence of stakeholder claims
2. Stakeholder synthesis: Accommodation of disparate stakeholders.
Hostile/instrumental/ethical organisational stance
3. Emergent system: Philosophy, process, performance criteria etc.
Stakeholder perceptions of management system
4. System operation: Perceived equity.
Procedural justice - stakeholder perceptions of performance management
5. System outcomes: Decisions on reward, progression etc.
Distributive justice-stakeholder perceptions of performance management system
decisions
6. System evaluation: Stakeholder evaluation of system efficacy,
efficiency and equity. Stakeholder's perceptions of overalloperation of
performance management system.
7. System reporting: Level and quality of Information disclosure and
significance of stakeholder reaction. Stakeholder's satisfaction with
dissemination and use of information of performance management system
Typically, instrumental process-driven models
have been widely accepted as 'an effective means to
identify and manage stakeholder groups'. To
effectively manage the potential conflict between the
various stakeholders, and to minimise its impact on an
organisation's ability to achieve its objectives, it
needs to work towards a balance between its
resources and the various claims from its stakeholders
(Asher, Mahoney and Mahoney, 2005; Frooman,
1999). In order to provide management with a more
functional and less complicated framework,
researchers have attempted to establish a set of
determinants of stakeholder salience for managers
(Asltonen, Jaakko and Tuomas, 2008; Harrison and
Freeman, 1999). Stakeholder salience goes beyond
the identification of stakeholders, and refers to the
degree to which managers give priority to competing
stakeholder claims, as current stakeholder framework
does not clearly explain the dynamics and the
complex considerations inherent in each stakeholder
(Michell et al., 1997; Parent and Deephouse, 2(07).
The salience of discrete stakeholder groups is
dependent upon three key relationship attributes:
power, legitimacy and urgency.
Power is the central determinant of outcomes in
situations where a stakeholder and a firm hold
opposing interests (Frooman, 1999). In an early
definition of power, Weber (1947) described power as
a situation where one social actor within a social
relationship would be in a position to carry out hislher
own will despite resistance from others. According to
Etzioni (1964) there are three types of power base
within the stakeholder network setting: coercive
power - physical power, the use of a loaded gun, a
whip, or physical sanctions; utilitarian power -
material power, the use of material or financial means
such as rewards, or granting material to allow one to
acquire goods and services; and social power -
symbolic resources, the use of symbols such as
prestige and esteem. Mitchell et al. (1997: 866)
proposed that power is not a stable state and is
transitory: it can be acquired as well as lost.
Therefore within a relationship a party that can gain
access to resource/s needed to exercise its power has
, '"
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the ability to impose its will in the relationship.
The notion of legitimacy is often coupled with
power when people attempting to evaluate the nature
of relationships in society (Mitchell et al., 1997).
Various scholars have made implicit assumption that
legitimate stakeholders are fundamentally powerful
(Mitchell et al, 1997). Suchman (1995), for example
defines legitimacy as .....a generalised perception or
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable,
proper, or appropriate within some socially
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and
definitions" (1995: 574). Mitchell et aI. (1997) accept
that Suchman's (1995) definition contains
descriptions that are useful in the approach to
stakeholder identification, but it is difficult to
operationalise. Mitchell et al. (1997) consider
legitimacy as only one of the three vital attributes to
achieve salience for a firm's managers.
A stakeholder group also needs urgency to drive
the claim and the power to enforce it. Urgency refers
to the degree to which the stakeholder claims call for
immediate action. The two vital conditions of
urgency as described by Jones (1995) and Mitchell et
aI. (1997) are: time sensitivity - when a relationship
or claim is of a time-sensitive nature; and criticality -
when the relationship or claim is critical to the
stakeholder. Attending to stakeholder claims in a
timely fashion has been a focus of management for
decades (Wartick and Mahon, 1994). However, being
time sensitive is necessary, but not sufficient. To be
identified as urgent and call for immediate action by
the management, the stakeholder's claim or its
relationship must be viewed by the firm as critical or
highly important (Mitchell et aI., 1997).
The three critical attributes of stakeholder
salience as proposed by Mitchell et aI. (1997) can be
summarised as follows:
• Power itself does not necessitate high
salience in a stakeholder-manager
relationship. Power gains its authority
through legitimacy and its exercise through
urgency.
• Legitimacy needs the other two attributes,
power and urgency to gain its power and
voice.
• Urgency, when combined with at least one
of the other two attributes, will increase the
level of salience in a stakeholder-manager
relationship.
Figure 2 Pictorial representation of this interrelationship
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Notwithstanding the general acceptance of the
descriptive models of stakeholder management as
presented above, their ability to prescribe the actual
conflict management capabilities required to manage
dissenting stakeholders groups is quite limited
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Source: Mitchell et ol., 1997.
(Greenwood, 2007; Roloff 2008; Zakhem, 2008;
Schaefer, 2(07). Recent literature in stakeholder
management has called a movement away from the
instrumental process-driven approach to one that
adopts a strategic view to understanding the resources
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and capabilities needed to effectively deal with
conflict and dissent between an organisation and its
stakeholder groups (Freeman, 2004; Frooman, 1999;
Zakhem, 2(08). 'Stakeholder management capability'
has been forwarded as one potential concept upon
which to conceptualise the strategic management of
dissenting stakeholder groups, and recommends that
the effective management of stakeholders must occur
at the 'rational', 'process' and 'transaction' levels of
analysis (Daake and Anthony, 2000; Elias, Cavana
and Jackson 2002; Malvey, Fottler and Slovensky,
2002; Olden, 2(03).
At the rational level of analysis, strategic
managers must "map" their organisational stakeholder
groups and accurately define the interests each has in
its operations. Whilst this at first may appear a
simple or straightforward exercise for the strategic
manager, the effective development of stakeholder
management capabilities requires extensive market
research to understand the nature and the source of the
interest. At the 'process' level of analysis, strategic
managers must include stakeholders in the firm's
actual strategic decision-making process (e.g. to invite
stakeholders into the boardroom discussions) with the
view to use their multiple perspectives as a resource
for the organisation. At the 'transaction' level of
analysis, strategic managers must establish and
execute "win-win" transactional exchanges with their
stakeholders. Given that it is in the early stages of its
development, the research that has been done into the
development of stakeholder management capabilities
has focused largely on private sector organisations.
There has been some work done on public-private
sector partnerships' stakeholder management (see El-
Gohary, Osman and EI-Diraby, 2006; Johnson, 1998;
Lim, Tan and Pan, 2(07), but as yet little empirical
work has been done to explore governments'
stakeholder management capabilities and the manner
in which they deal with the 'power', 'legitimacy' and
'urgency' of dissenting stakeholder groups.
3. Method
This paper undertook an analysis of the manner in
which the Tasmanian state government's dealt with
dissenting stakeholder groups that were concerned
with a controversial retail development proposed for a
Hobart Airport shopping precinct. This paper draws
upon the content analysis of a considerable number of
secondary data sources on the matter, which included
local councils' media publications, official newspaper
reports, special reports commissioned by peak
business bodies (and Tasmanian-based daily
newspaper) over a period of 35 months (i.e. from
August 2005 to June 2(08). After the conversion of
these sources to a Microsoft Word document format,
they were uploaded to the NV1VO qualitative data
analysis software program. Each of the documents
were then scrutinised and its content coded to provide
a basic definition of the types of stakeholder group
represented in the reports (i.e, whether the report
concerned a dissenting stakeholder group or not), as
well as the concomitant stakeholder management
strategy adopted by the Tasmanian state government.
The contents of the first round coding categories
were then further scrutinised to explore and define the
stakeholder management capabilities demonstrated by
the Tasmanian state government in their management
of the dissenting stakeholder groups. The
identification of similarities in the systematic
implementation of the stakeholder management
strategy, therefore, formed the unit of analysis for this
stage of coding. The text searching functions,
interpretations of data, coding, and the verification of
conclusions were facilitated by the use of the QSR
NVIVO software package. In the method literature, it
has been emphasised that computer software
programs such as NVIVO are of significant value in
qualitative analysis and any subsequent pattern
matching and theory building (Kelle, 1995; Weitzman
and Miles, 1995). The following section details the
case of the Tasmanian Direct Factory Outlet, and the
evidence of stakeholder management capability that
emanated from it.
In order to facilitate the theory building process
later in the research process, memos were maintained
about the data, their categories, and the relationships
between them as they emerged. Designed to store and
organise ideas about the data, they were integrated
into the analytic process. Wilson suggests that
memos assist in the development of theory in five
important ways:
• They require that you move
your thinking about the idea to a conceptual
level.
• They summarise the properties
of each category so that you can begin to
construct operational definitions.
• They summarise propositions
about relationships between categories and
their propositions.
• They begin to integrate
categories with networks of other categories.
• They relate your analysis to
other theories (1985: 420).
NVIVO has a facility for the creation and
retention of such memos for later consideration and
analysis. Utilising the memo capability within the
NVIVO package, memo reports were generated by
the software during 'stage two' coding. From these
reports, the interaction between the parties' became
clearer, the context of the various phenomena
surfaced, causes and effects were revealed, and
motivations were exposed. The themes emanating
from the 'second round' coding form the basis of the
discussion section that follows.
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4. The Case ofthe Tasmanian Direct
Factory Outlet (DFO)
In 2005, Austexx a leading Australian development
company proposed to build Australia's largest Direct
Factory Outlet (DFO) at Hobart Airport in Tasmania.
A DFO concept is described by Fernie (1997) and
Omar and Kent (2001) and as the "fourth wave of
retailing". A DFO incorporates a large range of
premium branded manufacturers under one roof in the
(form of a shopping mall) that is then promoted as a
discount distribution channel. The proposed Hobart
DFO is a circuit of about 100 direct factory outlets
organised so that shoppers move past them all
between entering and exiting the complex. Given the
relatively small size of the Tasmanian market (i.e.
Tasmania has a population of approximately 500 000
people), the proposed AUD$I00 million development
would be by far the largest Greenfield retail
development in the states' history. Indeed, the
proposed DFO was to be the largest of its type in the
whole of Australia. Throughout 2005 and 2006, the
developer and the Tasmanian state government
identified three important factors underpinning the
development: Firstly, that statistics indicated
approximately 50 per cent of retail spending by
Tasmanians is 'leaked' to similar DFO complexes
interstate; secondly, that it would contribute to the
economic development of the state; and thirdly, that it
would lead to the creation of additional jobs in the
retail sector:
... the DFO will provide lower prices
and more variety and cut the spending done
outside the municipality (The Mercury,
2005a).
This demonstrates council's long-held
view that Cambridge and the airport precinct
has great potential for economic
development (The Mercury, 2006a).
... the DFO will create 600 construction
jobs and 1000 full-time and part-time jobs
for the state labour market (The Mercury,
2005b).
After the DFO announcement was made to the
public, five distinct stakeholder groups presented their
arguments against the development. The first of these
groups were the opposition parties in the state
parliament, whose objections were concerned with the
state government's planning process and its business
dealings with the DFO developer, Austexx:
The state government had "refused" to
exercise its right to have the DFO go through
state planning processes (The Mercury,
2006e).
The state government's inappropriate
use of taxpayer's money to shepherd through
a "controversial" DFO development (The
Mercury, 2006d).
The second dissenting stakeholder groups were
classified as 'Local Councils' whose objection was
concerned with the state government's infrastructure
priorities. This group has expressed strong opposition
to the DFO development because of the likely
increase in public infrastructure costs, such as
upgrades to roads, stormwater, sewerage systems and
public transportation. To ask their constituents to pay
and support a mainland style development, which has
been labelled as unfair to local businesses was not
perceived to be a viable option for this group:
.. .it's outrageous that the state
government prepared to support the massive
project without assessing its social and
environmental implications and its impacts
on existing Tasmanian businesses (The
Mercury,2005c).
...if these extra costs are not born by the
developer or by the state government, then
they will become the responsibility of the
relevant councils (The Mercury, 2005d;
2006b; 2006i).
The third dissenting stakeholder groups were
classified as 'peak business bodies' such as the
Shopping Council of Australia, the Property Council
of Australia, the Australian Retailers Association and
the Tasmanian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
This group's objection concerned with the state
government's planning process, which most of this
group perceived as assisting the developer to get the
DFO into the state through the backdoor:
.. .if the DFO is approved, it will create
unfair competition in Tasmania's retail
market, which in tum will destroy the local
businesses in the CBD and its surrounding
areas (The Mercury, 2006c; 2006g; 2006h;
2006j).
The fourth dissenting stakeholder groups were
classified as 'local business owners' whose objections
were concerned with the uncertainty that the DFO has
created within the local business community and the
state government's planning process. This group
argued that the proposed DFO is too big for the state
and that it will destroy established local businesses:
...using the Australian Airport Act as a
way to exempt the DFO is having a negative
effect on local businesses as it creates an
unfair competition environment in the state
(The Mercury, 2005d).
...the DFO will "disembowel" the CBD,
and Hobart City will lose its appeal to local
shoppers and tourists (The Mercury, 2006k).
The fifth dissenting stakeholder groups were
classified as 'private citizens' whose objections were
concerned with the state government's infrastructure
priorities and the planning process. They perceived
that the state government's infrastructure priorities do
not include the needs of the local communities and
that the state government's planning process is not
working in the interest of the local business
, ~
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community:
... the DFO will be a huge white
elephant funded by the Tasmanian people
(The Mercury, 2006h).
The state government should have 'got
off its arse' long ago and pressured the
federal government to allow the project to go
through state planning laws (The Mercury,
2006g).
In order to manage (and perhaps marginalise) the
dissenting stakeholder groups' position on the DFO
development, the Tasmanian state government was
observed to have demonstrated three important
governance tactics (i.e, stakeholder management
capabilities) that reduced their salience. Firstly, the
state government was able to abdicate its own power
base by not opting to bring the DFO development
under the state planning laws, thereby enabling it to
claim that it's not the decision maker:
...it [the state government] is not the
decision maker for the proposed DFO
development; the federal government is.
(The Mercury, 2006f; 2006g; 2006h).
This abdication of power and responsibility had
the effect of outsourcing the responsibility for the
process (and the perceived equity therein) to a
legitimate alternative third party, thereby reducing the
local stakeholder group's legitimate power-base to
complain to their direct political representative about
the controversial development. In terms of the
stakeholder management capability concept, the
Tasmanian state government demonstrated an ability
to outsource any responsibility they may have been
perceived to have on the controversial issue, and
thereby abdicate any concomitant responsibility for
the equitable treatment of the stakeholder groups'
members. This capability also enabled the
government to deflect any criticism concerning delays
in the appeal/complaint process away from itself and
onto the legitimate third party.
Secondly, and in order to diminish the urgency
of the dissenting stakeholder groups' claims, the state
government was observed not to lobby the third party
(in this cast the Australian federal government) to
expedite the process, and continued with its position
that 'the state has to wait for the federal government's
decision'. By refusing to intervene or provide
lobbying support for the dissenting stakeholder group,
the Tasmanian state government was able to diminish
the urgency of the issue by elongating the decision
making process. In terms of the stakeholder
management capability concept, the Tasmanian state
government demonstrated an ability to diminish the
stakeholder group's motivation for their cause, as well
as their concern about the overall processes, reporting
procedures, and the outcomes of the governance
system.
Lastly, by removing the power to complain and
the urgency of the claims, the Tasmanian state
government effectively reduced the legitimacy of the
entire DFO controversy. Over time, the relevance and
importance of the DFO issue faded in its relative
importance, as the local community either 'moved on'
or was challenged by a new or more pressing issues:
... the last few months have been quite
good and things are only going to get better.
We are looking to expand. I think the DFO
will have an impact for a short time only
(The Mercury, 2007a).
It seems that the Tasmanian state government
achieved its objective by adopting a 'governance'
stance of simply doing 'nothing' for long enough.
However, it is the manner in which the state
government mobilised its resource and governance
processes to 'do nothing' that is of most interest here.
The Tasmanian state government did not simply
employ a naive set of delay tactics, but rather set in
play a series of legitimate inactions that could not
easily be criticised by the dissenting stakeholder
groups. The following discussion will attempt to
delineate some specific strategies and 'stakeholder
management capabilities' displayed in this case.
5. Discussion
This exploratory research suggests that the
'stakeholder management capability' concept has a
number of important implications for the
'instrumental process model for stakeholder
management' depicted in Figure l. Firstly,
institutions must go beyond the mere recognition that
different stakeholder groups exist, and develop
specific capabilities to accurately define the factors
that make a stakeholder group legitimate, influential
and their cause urgent within their community. This
would entail developing greater boundary spanning
capabilities, as well as the allocation of resources for
high quality environmental scanning. Secondly, and
in addition to the above, the organisation must strive
to specifically define the ideology of the stakeholder
groups, as well as the motivations of the individuals
within relevant stakeholder groups. Only when such
information is known to the organisation can it
effectively conceptualise its position within the
community, and fully understand the relationship and
expectation that the various stakeholder groups have
with it.
Thirdly, when an organisation is required to
respond to criticism or action by a dissenting
stakeholder group they must be capable of deflecting
or abdicating their responsibility for the issue at hand.
In the Tasmanian state government case, this
stakeholder management capability included the
creation of a 'power vacuum' (or more simply, a
capacity 'to do nothing' and get away with it) when
dealing with dissenting stakeholder group criticism.
By this, we interpret the Tasmanian state
government's action to abdicate their own power and
, \1)
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legitimacy to another body (in this case, the
Australian federal government) meant that the
dissenting stakeholder groups were similarly unable
to exercise their own power as constituents of the
Tasmanian state government. The effective
stakeholder management capability, therefore, would
consist of an 'ability to remove or reduce the power of
the dissenting stakeholder groups' to influence their
direct representatives in any political process.
Lastly, in terms of the 'system operation and
outcomes' , we feel that the Tasmanian state
government was able to use the procedures they
themselves developed to constrain the legitimacy of
the dissenting stakeholder groups by instituting a
number of due-process systems that served to extend
the time of the project's evaluation. This in tum
diminished the capacity of the dissenting stakeholders
to continue their protest given the time and cost
implications associated with a protracted campaign.
Essentially, the Tasmanian state government was able
to 'out-wait' the dissenting stakeholder groups, and to
marginalise the agitators at their core. Similarly, the
'urgency' associated with the controversial project
was diminished by the abdication of responsibility
and the protracted process employed by the
Tasmanian state government - over the period of
several months, the DFO issue changed from a
controversial one to one that became relatively
'routine' (perhaps even afait accompli) in the eyes of
the majority of Tasmanian residents, and the urgency
of the matter (and that of the dissenting stakeholder
group) was similarly and diminished over time.
Figure 3 proposes a model of stakeholder
management capability that reflects the evidence and
coding insights of this research.
Figure 3. A Model of Dissenting Stakeholder Management
1. Identification of salient stakeholder groups, perspectives and agendas
The ability to define the legitimacy, influence, urgencyof stakeholder groups
2. Stakeholder synthesis: Recognition of disparate stakeholders. The
ability to specifically define the ideological stanceof dissenting stakeholder groups
3. Emergent system: Philosophy, process, performance criteria etc.
The ability to managestakeholders' perception of the firm's management system
4. System operation: Outsourcing responsibility for equity of treatment.
The ability to deflect or abdicateresponsibility for the system'sperformance
5. System outcomes: Outsource and/or delay decisions on reward,
progression etc.
The ability to deflect or abdicateresponsibility for the system'soutcomes
6. System evaluation: Stakeholder evaluation of system efficacy,
efficiency and equity. The ability to diminish the dissenting stakeholder groups'
concern for the performance management system as well as their own cause.
7. System reporting: Level and quality of information disclosure and
significance of stakeholder reaction. The ability to diminishthe dissenting
stakeholder groups' concernfor the performance management systemas well as their
'Stakeholder management capability' as a
corporate governance concept appears worthy of
further research. This single case explored the
manner in which an Australian state government used
(and indeed 'didn't use') its resources strategically to
marginalise those stakeholder groups opposed to the
construction of a controversial DFO. The DFO case
demonstrates the state government's capacity to build
and influence legitimate systems that serve to
marginalise stakeholder dissent by removing their
ability to exercise power, and to reduce the urgency
and legitimacy of their dissent. In terms of theory, it
would appear that this case has implications at the
'rational', 'process' and 'transaction' levels of
stakeholder management. At the rational level of
analysis, the case indicates that managers must do
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more than simply "map" their organisational
stakeholder groups and go beyond simply defining the
interests each has in its operations instead to
understanding the ideology and personalities at the
core of the stakeholder group. At the 'process' level
of analysis, managers must consider developing
alternatives to the widely espoused 'inclusive'
management techniques that may include disengaging
dysfunctional stakeholder relationships and/or
ignoring stakeholder groups altogether. At the
'transaction' level of analysis, the case suggests that
strategic managers need not necessarily establish and
execute "win-win" exchanges with their stakeholder
groups - and instead consider the possibility that
some stakeholder group exchanges may result in a
'nil-all draw' that somehow favours the organisation.
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